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LESSONS FROM EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HARASSER DOCTRINE:
CHALLENGING SEX-SPECIFIC APPEARANCE AND DRESS CODES
DEBORAH ZALESNE*

I. INTRODUCTION
Employers seeking to enhance their corporate brand or to foster a
professional business environment frequently mandate that employees adhere
to personal appearance requirements while at work. These requirements often
regulate everything from dress and grooming habits to personal hygiene.
Though appearance codes are generally based on stereotypical assumptions
about how men and women are supposed to look and act, courts tend to
1
acknowledge their validity out of deference to employers’ business judgment.
Thus, employers are permitted under the law to require male employees to be
2
clean shaven and to have short hair, to ask male employees to wear suits and
3
ties, and to require female employees to wear skirts, dresses, or even high4
5
heeled shoes and makeup. Employers can also lawfully prohibit visible tattoos,
* Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. B.A., 1988, Williams College;
J.D., 1992, University of Denver College of Law; LL.M., 1997, Temple University School of Law. I
would like to thank Professors Michael Jaffe, Ruthann Robson, and Rick Rossein for their insightful
comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. I would also like to thank my colleagues on the panel,
as well as the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy for sponsoring this symposium, and Anthony
Cardoso, Juliette Forstenzer and Cara Moore for their invaluable research assistance.
1. See infra notes 23–27 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998) (upholding a
policy applying different hair length standards to male and female employees), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1000 (1998); Knott v. Mo. Pacific R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (upholding a policy
requiring male employees to keep sideburns neat and well-trimmed and prohibiting “pork chop”
side burns and long hair on men, noting that, although female employees had to conform to other
dress standards, the differences in the policy toward male and female employees were “minor” and
“reasonable,” reflecting “customary modes of grooming”); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895
(9th Cir. 1974) (upholding a company policy requiring men—but not women—to wear their hair
short because the discrimination was not based on an immutable characteristic).
3. See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding a
policy requiring male employees to wear ties, though female employees did not have to comply with
a similar requirement, as the requirement was not “overly burdensome” and simply “serve[d] to
extend an image to its customers which Safeway believe[d] [was] beneficial to its business”).
4. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that a
policy requiring female employees to wear makeup, stockings, and colored nail polish was
permissible where male employees’ appearance was similarly restricted); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.,
766 F.2d 1205, 1215 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding no Title VII violation where employer required plaintiff, a
female news anchor, to alter her clothes and makeup based on negative responses from audience
focus groups because employer treated male news anchors similarly).
5. See, e.g., Baldetta v. Harborview Med. Ctr., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13939 (9th Cir. June 11,
1997) (upholding employer’s ban on tattoos even where the plaintiff’s tattoo identifying him as HIV
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body piercings, unconventional hairstyles such as dreadlocks, cornrows, and
6
7
braids, and impose weight requirements.
Although many courts treat employer-mandated appearance codes as
8
“legally insignificant” and have long tolerated them, the weight of literature
and theory on the subject, as well as the intensity and frequency with which
9
employees challenge them through litigation, indicate that seemingly trivial
dress codes can actually have important implications for autonomy and gender
equality in the workplace. Far from trivial to some people, dress codes present
the dual problem of preventing some employees from expressing their core
sense of gender identity, while simultaneously reinforcing hidden prejudices
embedded in social norms.
Under the widely-adopted “unequal burdens” test from Frank v. United
Airlines, a policy that has different grooming and appearance requirements for
men and women is permissible, as long as it imposes equal burdens on males
10
and females and does not limit the employment opportunities of only one sex.
11
Under this test, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit as recently as April 2006, if a
dress code is equally offensive to men and women, it will still be permissible
since it does not discriminate against only one sex. Sex-specific appearance
codes requiring, for example, men to wear ties and women to wear skirts, both
positive arguably addressed a public health concern); Inturri v. City of Hartford, 365 F. Supp. 2d 240
(D. Conn. 2005) (permitting the city police department to order personnel to cover offensive or
unprofessional tattoos); Riggs v. City of Fort Worth, 229 F. Supp. 2d 572, 582–83 (N.D. Tex. 2002)
(permitting a requirement that a police officer with tattoos all over his body wear long pants and
long sleeves during work, even though he consequently suffered from heat exhaustion and had to be
moved to a desk job).
6. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004) (rejecting a Costco
employee’s request for exemption from the employer’s ban on body piercings because of her
involvement in the Church of Body Modification, finding the restriction was justified based on
customer preference and where Costco had made reasonable accommodation to allow the employee
to cover her piercings), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1131 (2005); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp.
229, 232–33 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding policy which prohibited both women and men from wearing
hair in cornrows did not violate Title VII on grounds of sex or race); Carswell v. Peachford Hosp.,
No. C80-222A, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14562 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 1981) (upholding employer policy
prohibiting female employee from wearing hair in cornrows); Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F.
Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding policy prohibiting plaintiff from wearing hair in dreadlocks
legally permissible).
7. See, e.g., Horton v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. C-93-0225-VRW, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4265, at
*16 (D. Cal. March 27, 1998) (finding employer’s use of weight tables not inherently discriminatory).
8. Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community
Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2580 (1994). Dress and appearance codes have
“long been tolerated under the auspices of ‘managerial discretion’ or a business’ attempt to establish
corporate image, attract customers, or ensure health and safety standards are met.” Serafina Raskin,
Sex-based Discrimination in the American Workforce: Title VII and the Prohibition Against Gender
Stereotyping, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 247, 247 (2006). Dress codes are especially tolerated when
they regulate non-immutable characteristics such as hair length: “From the courts’ perspective, it is a
minimal intrusion upon the employee’s personal autonomy to get a simple haircut.” Sandi Farrell,
Toward Getting Beyond the Blame Game: A Critique of the Ideology of Voluntarism in Title VII
Jurisprudence, 92 KY. L.J. 483, 493 (2004).
9. Darlene Jespersen, for example, preferred to leave her job rather than wear makeup on a
daily basis. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108.
10. See Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
11. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109.
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disadvantage individuals who diverge from prescribed, gender-based
stereotypes of appropriate appearance and affirm gendered distinctions that
12
devalue women. Nonetheless, under Frank’s unequal burden test, if such dress
codes are applied evenly to men and women, they are generally upheld.
In recent years, courts have been increasingly willing to recognize that
harassment of people who fail to conform to stereotypical gender roles
13
constitutes proscribed discrimination based on sex. Mandating conformity to
the gender paradigm through compulsory appearance codes similarly penalizes
individuals who fail to conform to stereotypical norms and perpetuates the
existence of traditional gender identity and behavioral norms that devalue
women, feminized men, and sexual minorities. Using principles from sexual
harassment law as a model for the development of dress code law, I argue that
in some cases, even dress codes that equally burden men and women may
constitute either gender identity or gender expression discrimination—or both—
14
and thereby violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
In sexual harassment law, courts have grappled with the “equal
15
opportunity harasser” problem. Formalistically following the letter of Title VII,
which requires that discrimination be “because of sex” for a discrimination
claim to be actionable, many courts over the years have held that if an employer
harasses both men and women, the conduct does not rise to the level of sexual
16
harassment because both sexes are treated equally. Such holdings are based on
the idea that without comparative evidence showing differential treatment of
men and women, harassing conduct that targets both sexes cannot be found to
violate Title VII. Despite some courts’ continuing adherence to this rigid notion
of discrimination that requires comparative evidence, many courts have rejected
the equal opportunity harasser defense, allowing for the possibility of actionable
sexual harassment of some women and some men in the same workplace by the
17
same employer.
Since Title VII does not define “because of sex” and the Supreme Court has
left open the possibility of various formulations, courts have been able to find
ways around the causation hurdle presented in equal opportunity harasser
cases, ranging from bypassing discussion of the “because of sex” requirement
altogether to espousing a broader meaning of the term “sex.” The best-reasoned
cases and commentary, noting the absurdity of a rule that provides an incentive
for a defendant to harass members of both sexes in order to create a defense to

12. See infra Parts IV.A & IV.B.
13. See infra notes 75 and 78 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 82–87.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000).
15. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. Related to the equal opportunity harasser is
the bisexual harasser. An equal opportunity harasser may or may not be bisexual but sexually
harasses members of both sexes, whereas a bisexual harasser is, in fact, bisexual, but may not
actually harass members of both sexes. See Sandra Levitsky, Footnote 55: Closing the “Bisexual Defense”
Loophole in Title VII Sexual Harassment Cases, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1013 (1996). Because of parallels with
the dress code cases, this Article deals exclusively with the equal opportunity harasser.
16. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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sexual harassment, generally examine individual plaintiffs’ claims separately.
This approach considers whether the conduct directed at an individual was
based on that individual’s sex, gender, or failure to conform to gender
stereotypes, without engaging in a direct comparison with the treatment of
employees of the opposite sex.
Applying the unequal burdens test to appearance codes presents a
challenge similar to the equal opportunity harasser conundrum: even if applied
relatively equally to men and women, sex-specific dress codes can be oppressive
and discriminatory to members of both sexes. They perpetuate power
paradigms harmful to both men and women and penalize individuals who
deviate from social norms. Importing interpretations of Title VII developed from
the equal opportunity harasser doctrine to dress code cases—which also fall
under the purview of Title VII—would allow courts to focus on the sex-based
underpinnings of employer dress codes that construct women as generally
inferior to men and the harm that dress codes present to individuals who
deviate from accepted gender norms, without requiring comparative evidence
of unequal burdens to both sexes.
Part II of this Article sets forth the state of the law dealing with employermandated appearance and dress codes by examining both the types of plaintiffs
who challenge dress codes and the nature of the typical challenges. It also
analyzes the unequal burdens test employed by courts to resolve those cases.
Part III examines the development of the law surrounding the equal opportunity
harasser. This Part delves into the ambiguities inherent in the “because of sex”
language of Title VII and the various ways in which courts have circumvented
this hurdle when a supervisor harasses both men and women.
Part IV suggests ways in which the same lines of analysis can be employed
in cases involving mandatory appearance codes. Specifically, this Part exposes
two flaws in the unequal burdens test and proposes two alternate approaches.
Drawing from the equal opportunity harasser doctrine, the proposed
approaches are better suited to the arena of dress codes and are more consistent
with the substantial body of existing Title VII sex discrimination law. The first
approach would use an individualized analysis that considers the harm each
individual plaintiff experiences from sex-specific dress codes, without requiring
comparative evidence. This approach would emphasize the intangible harm
imposed on women by dress codes that have roots in negative stereotypes about
a woman’s role in the workplace, as well as the harm to men that arises from the
same negative stereotypes that construct an image of appropriate “masculine”

18. See, e.g., Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that
even if plaintiff used sexual epithets equal in intensity and in an equally degrading manner against
male employees, he cannot thereby “cure” his conduct toward women); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating
Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (D. Wyo. 1993) (finding that the nature of a supervisor’s remarks—
made towards both men and women—indicated that he harassed the plaintiffs because of their
gender and that such conduct constituted exactly the type of harassment contemplated to fall within
the purview of Title VII); Levitsky, supra note 15, at 1045 (arguing that the increasing use of the
“bisexual defense” to escape Title VII liability illustrates one of the fundamental inadequacies of the
comparative standard in sexual harassment law); Mark J. McCullough, One Is a Claim, Two Is a
Defense: Bringing an End to the Equal Opportunity Harasser Defense, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 469, 484–85
(2005) (arguing for an individual mode of analysis in Title VII discrimination cases).
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appearance that not all men meet. The second approach would conceive of “sex”
in its broadest, most meaningful sense, encompassing not just biological sex but
also gender, gender expression, and gender identity. Drawing from the growing
body of law on gender identity and expression discrimination, this approach
would extend the inquiry beyond comparing the burden imposed by sexspecific dress codes on men and women as biological classes to comparing the
burden imposed on men and women who fail to conform to communityimposed norms related to sex and others. This Article ultimately concludes that
if the well-reasoned law rejecting the equal opportunity harasser defense were
applied to sex-specific dress codes, such appearance mandates would no longer
be permitted.
II. THE LAW SURROUNDING APPEARANCE AND DRESS CODES
Dress and appearance issues usually fall under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to discriminate
against any individual with respect to . . . terms, conditions or privileges of
employment . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
19
national origin.” Gender-specific dress codes are clearly terms and conditions
20
of employment within the meaning of Title VII. Even though they may amount
to sex discrimination in violation of Title VII in some cases, they are more often
accepted as a legitimate business decision, even when based on assumptions
21
and expectations about gender differences.
Initially, courts held that reasonable dress and grooming requirements
which regulated mutable characteristics of both sexes—such as clothing, hair,
cosmetics and jewelry—did not violate Title VII. In contrast, appearance codes
seeking to regulate immutable characteristics—such as sex, race or national
22
origin—were generally not permissible. Under this regime, issues arose when
appearance standards regulating mutable characteristics were gender-specific.
Under the slightly broader unequal burdens test, such standards are generally
upheld as long as they are comparable in terms of conventional societal custom
23
and do not impose a greater burden on one sex over the other. For example,
women can be sanctioned for wearing too much makeup where male employees
24
are also required to dress conservatively. Additionally, grooming codes for

19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
20. Additionally, the National Labor Relations Board has held that appearance codes are “terms
and conditions of employment” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. See, e.g.,
Crittenton Hosp., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (2004) (finding uniform and fingernail policies regulating the
appearance of nurses to be mandatory subjects of bargaining). For a discussion of how labor law and
collective bargaining can be used to protect employees from sex-specific appearance codes, see
Michael J. Yelnosky, What Do Unions Do About Appearance Codes?, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 521
(2007).
21. See infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
22. See generally William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the Ninth Circuit’s Unequal
Burdens Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming Standards Under Title VII, 84 N.C. L. REV.
1357, 1359 (2006); Michael W. Fox, Piercings, Makeup, and Appearance: The Changing Face of
Discrimination Law, 69 TEX. B. J. 564, 564 (2006); Farrell, supra note 8.
23. See Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
24. See, e.g., Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987).
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men are more likely to be upheld than similar codes for women, most likely
25
because they tend to be less demeaning than grooming codes for women. Thus,
26
courts have permitted prohibitions of jewelry for men, but not women, and
regulations regarding men’s hair length and facial hair, as long as these
27
requirements were meant to protect the company’s business image.
There are, however, some distinct limitations. When a dress code is applied
solely or more stringently to women, it is more likely to be struck down. Thus,
28
29
employers cannot require only women to wear a uniform or contact lenses,
30
prohibit tattoos on women but not men, or have different weight requirements
31
for men and women, if one is more burdensome to meet than the other.
Further, dress codes requiring women to wear “skimpy” or sexy uniforms have
been held to constitute gender discrimination if that uniform is likely to invite
32
sexual harassment. In EEOC v. Sage Realty, for example, female lobby
attendants in an office building were required to wear a poncho with snaps at
each wrist but otherwise open on the sides, and were prohibited from wearing a
33
shirt, blouse, or skirt under the outfit. The court struck down the dress code,
holding that requiring women to wear the uniform, which was “short and
revealing on both sides [such that] her thighs and portions of her buttocks were

25. See generally Farrell, supra note 8, at 493 (explaining that “Congress’ intent was to afford
equal employment opportunities for women relative to those available to men” and courts “cannot
seem to conceive of any way in which protecting male employees with long hair could possibly
effectuate that goal”).
26. See, e.g., Capaldo v. Pan Am. Fed. Credit Union, No. 86 CV 1944, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14475, *2 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 1987) (upholding a rule prohibiting male, but not female, employees
from wearing earrings), aff’d without opinion, 837 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987); Lockhart v. La.-Pac. Corp.,
795 P.2d 602 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding “a reasonable grooming policy” forbidding male
employees from wearing “facial jewelry,” while permitting female employees to wear earrings).
27. See supra note 1. See generally EEOC Compl. Man. § 619.3 (BNA) (2002).
28. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979)
(holding that requiring women to wear uniforms when men could wear “appropriate business
attire” violated Title VII); O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263,
266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that a policy requiring women to wear uniform smocks but allowing
men to wear normal business dress demeaned women).
29. See, e.g., Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (striking down a rule
requiring female flight attendants to wear contact lenses when male flight attendants could wear
glasses), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
30. See, e.g., Hub Folding Box Co. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrim., No. 99-P-1848, 2001
WL789248 (Mass. App. Ct. July 12, 2001) (striking down a rule permitting men, but not women, to
have conspicuous tattoos).
31. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (striking down a
rule requiring female flight attendants to maintain a weight corresponding to women of “medium”
build determined by an insurance company table, but permitting men to maintain the weight
corresponding to men of “large” build); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that airline’s weight requirement on its face constituted discrimination under Title VII
because the policy applied only to females and the airline did not assert any non-discriminatory
justification for its practice); Laffey, 567 F.2d at 454 (striking down a policy imposing weight
restrictions on female but not male flight attendants).
32. See, e.g., EEOC v. Newtown Inn Assocs., 647 F. Supp. 957, 958 (E.D. Va. 1986); Priest v.
Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609–11
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
33. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. at 604.
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34

exposed,” created a hostile working environment under Title VII sexual
harassment law.
Even facially discriminatory policies, however, will be upheld according to
the language of Title VII if there is a bona fide occupational qualification
35
(BFOQ). To constitute a BFOQ, the discrimination must relate to the
employee’s ability to do her job, not just the success of the business based on an
36
actual or perceived customer preference. Accordingly, it is generally
permissible for an employer to make an employment decision based on gender,
religion, or national origin where “religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
37
particular business or enterprise.” The BFOQ defense is also generally available
38
39
in age discrimination cases, though race can never constitute a BFOQ.
In April 2006, the Ninth Circuit upheld the unequal burdens test, finding
that a gender-specific grooming code did not violate Title VII. In Jespersen v.
40
Harrah’s Operating Co., a female employee of Harrah’s Casino claimed that the
employer’s “Personal Best” grooming code violated Title VII. Female bartenders
at Harrah’s were required to wear makeup, stockings, and colored nail polish,
and to wear their hair teased, curled, or styled, while male employees were
prohibited from wearing makeup or colored nail polish and were required to
41
maintain short haircuts and neatly trimmed fingernails. Jespersen found these
requirements so inconsistent with her gender identity that she refused to
comply with them. She advanced two arguments to support her refusal to wear
the required makeup. First, she argued that the policy failed Frank’s unequal
burdens test because the financial cost of purchasing makeup, together with the
time it takes to apply it, imposed a heavier burden on women than any burden

34. Id.
35. Title VII states, “Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
36. See, e.g., Local 567 Am. Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Mich. Council 25, 635
F. Supp. 1010 (D. Mich. 1986) (holding that privacy rights of mental health patients could justify the
requirement for same sex healthcare workers as a BFOQ); EEOC v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D.
Ill. 1993) (holding a women’s health club’s refusal to employ men in managerial positions did not
violate Title VII because the positions allegedly involved substantial intimate contact with
members); Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (D. Ill. 1984) (holding employer’s
requirement that janitors be men was a BFOQ because janitors who cleaned the men’s bathrooms
could see men using the facilities and workers were prevalent during daylight hours); Torres v.
Wisc. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding maximum security
women’s facility’s hiring of only female correctional officers was a BFOQ). See generally David B.
Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240, 243–44 (2004) (criticizing
courts that rely on BFOQ exception to Title VII to uphold sex-discriminatory dress and appearance
requirements); Megan Kelly, Making-Up Conditions of Employment: The Unequal Burdens Test as a
Flawed Mode of Analysis in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 45 (2006).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (West Supp. 2006).
39. See Morton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 272 F.3d 1249, 1260 n.11 (9th Cir. 2001).
40. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006).
41. Id. at 1107.
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imposed on men. She also argued that the policy forced her to conform to sex
stereotypes, in violation of Title VII, stating that it “made her feel sick, degraded,
exposed, and violated,” and “‘forced her to be feminine’ and to become ‘dolled
43
up’ like a sexual object.” She alleged that it “interfered with her ability to be an
effective bartender . . . because it ‘took away [her] credibility as an individual
44
and as a person.’”
The court held that Harrah’s rules were not more burdensome for women
45
than for men, who had to maintain short haircuts and neatly trimmed nails,
46
and therefore did not violate the “unequal burdens” test articulated in Frank.
Further, the court held that the employer’s rules “d[id] not require Jespersen to
conform to a stereotypical image that would objectively impede her ability to
47
perform her job requirements as a bartender.” The en banc majority
emphasized that “[t]his is not a case where the dress or appearance requirement
is intended to be sexually provocative, and tending to stereotype women as sex
48
objects.” Rather, Jespersen was simply required to wear a uniform covering her
entire body designed for both male and female employees. Accordingly, the
court found that the policy showed no “discriminatory or sexually stereotypical
49
intent on the part of Harrah’s.”
Three dissenting judges argued for the inclusion of less tangible factors
such as gender stereotyping in the unequal burdens test. In his dissent to the
2004 appellate opinion, Judge Thomas suggested that Jespersen could prove her
case under either an impermissible sex stereotypes theory or imposition of an
50
unequal burden. He noted that being “properly made-up,” as required by the
policy, was an additional burden to women. He also argued that the makeup
requirement is based on a sex stereotype that sends “a message of gender
51
subordination.”
In his dissent to the 2006 opinion, Judge Pregerson, joined by Judges
Kozinski, Graber, and Fletcher, argued that Harrah’s “Personal Best” policy was
motivated by sexual stereotyping. He noted that the makeup requirement was,
52
in effect, a “facial uniform” imposed only on females. Judge Kozinski, joined by
Judges Graber and Fletcher, agreed that the burden on women was greater than
53
the burden on men. However, he rejected the need for expert or special
evidence to show the time and money burden of the makeup policy, as most

42. Id. at 1110.
43. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 409 F.3d
1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
44. Id.
45. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111.
46. Id. at 1109–11 (citing Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
47. Id. at 1113.
48. Id. at 1112 (comparing the case to EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y.
1981)).
49. Id.
50. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005).
51. Id. at 1086.
52. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1114 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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women have applied makeup and most men have waited while women apply
54
it. Further, he pointed out that the choice of wearing makeup or losing one’s
55
job was not a choice males in the same position were forced to make.
III. GRAPPLING WITH TITLE VII’S “BECAUSE OF SEX” CAUSATION REQUIREMENT: THE
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HARASSER AS A MODEL FOR DRESS CODE LAW
The unequal burdens test allows employers to institute a dress policy that
is burdensome to women, as long as a corresponding policy is equally
burdensome to men. As the Jespersen dissent pointed out, under this logic, “a
sex-differentiated appearance requirement that burdens women . . . could be
permissible if the employer unfairly burdened men via another sex56
differentiated appearance requirement.” Thus, despite the fact that all sexspecific appearance codes are inherently based on harmful sex stereotypes, and
unfairly discriminate against both men and women on the basis of gender
identity and expression, such codes will be upheld as long as that unfair
treatment of men and women is equivalent.
A similar conundrum is seen in sexual harassment cases involving the
“equal opportunity” harasser. These cases involve perpetrators who harass both
men and women alike. A plaintiff who has been harassed in this way may be
unable to prove the harassment was “because of sex,” as required for a Title VII
57
cause of action, since both sexes endured equally bad treatment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit first
raised the anomalous issue of an “equal opportunity” or bisexual harasser in the
now-famous footnote 55 of Barnes v. Costle, which states that “in the case of a
bisexual superior, the insistence upon sexual favors would not constitute gender
58
discrimination because it would apply to male and female employees alike.”
Subsequent courts struggled to handle the seemingly illogical consequence of
strictly following the Title VII rule that harassment be “because of sex.” A string
of cases found that harassing people of both sexes was a defense to a Title VII

54. Id.
55. Id. at 1118.
56. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1085.
57. For articles discussing the conundrum of the equal opportunity or bisexual harasser, see
generally Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of “Sex”: Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment Under Title
VII, 20 VT. L. REV. 55 (1995); Katherine Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 691 (1997); Martin J. Katz, Reconsidering Attraction in Sexual Harassment, 79 IND. L.J. 101 (2004);
Levitsky, supra note 15; Steven S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for Recognizing
Sexual Harassment of Homosexuals Under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 383 (1996); Dawn Macready,
Statutory Construction as a Means of Judicial Restraint on Government: A Case Study in Bisexual
Harassment Under Title VII, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 659 (2001); McCullough, supra note 18; Ronald
Turner, Title VII and the Inequality-Enhancing Effects of the Bisexual and Equal Opportunity Harasser
Defenses, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 341 (2005).
58. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The issue of the bisexual harasser
remained hypothetical for nearly twenty years, until it was first taken up in Ryczek v. Guest Servs.,
Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1995). In that case, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia declined to rule specifically on whether a person who harasses both sexes is immune from
Title VII liability, but noted that the language of footnote fifty-five in Barnes presents an interesting
Title VII problem in that it requires the court to develop standards for proof of bisexuality. Id. at 761
n.6.
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sexual harassment claim, as conduct cannot be “because of sex” where men and
59
women are treated equally. In 1998, the Supreme Court gave subtle support for
that line of cases in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services., Inc., a case allowing a
60
cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment. In that case, the Court heavily
emphasized the importance of comparative evidence showing one sex was
treated differently from the other, though it never went as far as saying such
61
evidence was required. Nonetheless, although the circuit courts are still
divided on the scope and meaning of the “because of sex” standard, a growing
body of authority now rejects the equal opportunity harasser defense and
recognizes that harassing conduct directed at both men and women that is
62
sufficiently severe and pervasive does amount to sexual harassment.
59. See, e.g., Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding no actionable
harassment claim where a male supervisor was equally abusive to both men and women); Holman
v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that equal opportunity harassment of
employees of both sexes cannot support Title VII sex discrimination claim, as conduct is not
“because of sex”); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating, in dicta, that
equal opportunity harassment does not amount to gender discrimination under Title VII); Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904–05 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that in “cases in which a supervisor
makes sexual overtures to workers of both sexes or where the conduct complained of is equally
offensive to male and female workers . . . the sexual harassment would not be based upon sex
because men and women alike are accorded like treatment . . . [and] the plaintiff would have no
remedy under Title VII”); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that only in
the rare case of a bisexual supervisor who harasses both men and women could sexual harassment
not amount to sex discrimination); Venezia v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., Inc., No. 03C7225, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4281, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2004) (holding that “[a]n ‘equal opportunity harasser’ is not
covered by Title VII”), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 421 F.3d 468 (7th Cir. 2005); Cabaniss v.
Coosa Valley Med. Ctr., No. CV 93-PT-2710-E, 1995 WL 241937, at *26 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 20, 1995)
(recognizing that when the “‘conduct complained of is equally offensive to male and female
workers, . . . the sexual harassment would not be based on sex because men and women are
accorded like treatment’” (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)));
Raney v. Dist. of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that a bisexual supervisor
who sexually harasses only one sex is liable for sex discrimination under Title VII, but that there is
no sex discrimination where a supervisor harasses both sexes equally).
60. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
61. Id. at 80–81 (stating that a plaintiff can prove that harassment was caused by sex by
“offer[ing] direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both
sexes in a mixed-sex workplace”).
62. See, e.g., Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that “[i]t is axiomatic
that mistreatment at work, whether through subjection to a hostile environment or through such
concrete deprivations as being fired or being denied a promotion, is actionable under Title VII only
when it occurs because of an employee’s sex, or other protected characteristic”); Smith v. First Union
Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 238–39, 242 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the argument that a female plaintiff,
who was subjected “to a barrage of threats and gender-based insults” by her supervisor, could not
have been harassed on account of her sex because both men and women complained about the
alleged perpetrator); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting “[i]t would be
exceedingly perverse if a male worker could buy his supervisors and his company immunity from
Title VII liability by taking care to harass sexually an occasional male worker, though his preferred
targets were female”); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463–64 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding that a hostile or offensive work environment is based on sex when the supervisor’s abuse is
directed at both sexes, but the gender-specific abuse is limited to females); Labonia v. Doran Assocs.,
LLC, No. 3:01CV2399, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17025, at *9 (D. Conn. Aug. 25, 2004) (maintaining that
“‘[t]he inquiry into whether ill treatment was actually sex-based discrimination cannot be shortcircuited by the mere fact that both men and women are involved’” (quoting Brown, 257 F.3d at
254)); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1336–37 (D. Wyo. 1993) (rejecting a bar
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A. The Causation Problem Generally
Of all the elements of a sexual harassment claim, arguably the most
conceptually difficult—and the one eliciting the greatest attention from both
courts and scholars—is the requirement that the harassment be “because of
63
sex.” It is this causation requirement that enables the equal opportunity
harasser. The problem is two-fold: (1) Congress inadequately defined “because
of” which is susceptible to a variety of meanings, and (2) although “sex” usually
means “biological sex,” the word is often used interchangeably with “gender,”
creating an additional ambiguity in the standard.
1. When is Harassment “Because of” Sex?
The question of the underlying cause of harassment has led to great
confusion and disagreement among both courts and commentators. Title VII
does not specify whether harassment must be intentional to be “because of sex,”
and courts have been left to grapple with “how much” of the employment
64
decision has to be shown to be sex-based to meet the standard. In addition, it is
unclear from the statutory language whether males and females must be treated
differently, or whether it is sufficient to show that sexualized conduct was
65
invidious. Indeed, Professor Martin Katz observed that “in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, the Supreme Court used over twenty different formulations to describe
Title VII’s causation requirement,” including “‘a discernable factor,’” “‘a
significant factor,’” “‘a motivating part,’” “‘a part,’” “a ‘substantial’ factor,” and
66
“a ‘but-for’ cause,” among others. Each of these formulations, in turn, was left
undefined, leaving room for wide-ranging interpretations. In 1991, Congress
narrowed the test to the “motivating factor” standard and the “same action”
67
standard, but again, failed to adequately define these terms. At the same time,
courts interpreting different statutes have deviated from those tests, using other
68
vaguely defined terms, “generating a thicket of vague, undefined, and often69
conflicting verbal formulations for causation.”
Most relevant to the equal opportunity harasser problem is whether
comparative evidence and a showing of differential treatment are essential for a

against Title VII liability for equal opportunity harassers and finding disparate treatment based on
sex when committed by a male supervisor against employees of both sexes).
63. There has been a flurry of recent law review articles dealing with the causation requirement.
See, e.g., Camille Hebert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does Motive Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L.
REV. 341 (2005); Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in
Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489 (2006); Robert A. Kearney, The Disparate Impact Hostile
Environment Claim: Sexual Harassment Scholarship at a Crossroads, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 185
(2003); Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, “Because of . . . Sex”: Rethinking the Protections Afforded Under Title
VII in the Post-Oncale World, 69 ALB. L. REV. 139 (2005); David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex?
The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (2002); Franke, supra note 57.
64. See generally Schwartz, supra note 63, at 1709–10.
65. See id.
66. Katz, supra note 63, at 491 n.5.
67. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991). See generally Katz, supra note 63, at 492.
68. See Katz, supra note 63, at 492–93.
69. See id. at 550.
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finding of discrimination. In Oncale, the Supreme Court proposed two
“evidentiary routes” that would support an inference that conduct in a sexual
harassment case involving two parties of the same sex occurred because of sex.
First, the Court stated that a trier of fact might reasonably infer the requisite sexbased causal nexus “if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and
derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is
70
motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.”
Second, the Court suggested a same-sex plaintiff could “offer direct comparative
evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a
71
mixed-sex workplace.” The Court thus conceived of conduct based on sex as
conduct that affects males in one manner and females in another, giving rise to a
direct comparison across the biologically-defined divide.
The Court’s dicta offering examples of sex-based conduct do not, however,
purport to require the forms of evidence discussed therein, or to preclude
plaintiffs from raising an inference of sex-based causation by other means. Indeed,
if under Oncale it is possible to find sexual harassment against a male in an allmale work environment, then certainly it is possible to find sexual harassment
without comparative evidence showing how the opposite sex was treated, since,
of course, such evidence would not exist in an all-male workplace. Though in
the post-Oncale judicial landscape direct comparative evidence of how the
harasser treated members of the opposite sex may be more likely to overcome an
72
73
equal opportunity harasser defense, no court has required such a showing.
2. The Ambiguity of “Sex”
The ambiguity inherent in the word “sex” has also been the subject of rich
74
debate. Courts have interpreted the word “sex” as narrowly as just biological
75
76
77
sex, and as broadly as gender, gender stereotypes and identity, sexual
78
79
imagery or epithets, and sexual behavior.

70. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
71. Id. at 80–81.
72. See, e.g., Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the
plaintiff did not satisfy the “direct comparative evidence” evidentiary route articulated in Oncale
because his evidence proved only that the alleged harasser treated the plaintiff differently from
everyone else; he did not show that the harasser treated one gender differently than the other); Lack,
240 F.3d at 261 (reversing jury award on the basis of plaintiff’s failure to produce “plausible
evidence” that harassment was precipitated by defendant’s “hostility to Lack as a man”).
73. Schwartz, supra note 63, at 1713.
74. For a thorough and insightful discussion of the various possible interpretations of “because
of sex,” see generally Marvin Dunson III, Sex, Gender, and Transgender: The Present and Future of
Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 465, 495 (2001) (surveying the various
scholarly interpretations of “because of sex”); Schwartz, supra note 63, at 1709–14.
75. See, e.g., Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 701 (7th Cir.
2000) (holding “Congress intended the term ‘sex’ to mean ‘biological male or biological female,’ and
not one’s sexuality or sexual orientation”).
76. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993) (using “because of . . . sex” and
“because of . . . gender” interchangeably); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239 (holding that Congress
intended to “forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment decisions”). See
generally Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex
from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995) (advocating an interpretation of “because of sex” that
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The term “sex” embodies many interrelated factors, including
chromosomes, genitalia, secondary sex characteristics, gender traits, and
sexuality. Traditionally, each of these concepts was thought to embody duality:
All people were thought to be either male or female (duality in chromosomes,
genitalia, and secondary sex characteristics), masculine or feminine (duality in
gender traits), and sexually attracted to only males or only females (duality in
sexuality). A person’s biological chromosomes and genitalia were used to
determine all other factors. That is, a person with male genitalia was expected to
act in a masculine fashion and to be sexually attracted to females, and vice versa.
When all five factors converge in one person, the courts need not consider all the
ideas embodied in the term “sex.” But it is now abundantly clear that there is a
includes gender, explaining, “sex bears an epiphenomenal relationship to gender; that is, under close
examination, almost every claim with regard to sexual identity or sex discrimination can be shown
to be grounded in normative gender rules and roles”).
77. See, e.g., Hellebusch v. City of Wentzville, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20828, at *3, *5–*6 (E.D. Mo.
Nov. 21, 1996) (recognizing that female employee in police department who was consistently subjected
to taunts that she should be “at home baking cookies and taking care of her children” was harassed
because of her sex); Zorn v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (recognizing that
management-level female plaintiff who was consistently asked to perform stereotypically female tasks
such as cleaning up after meetings and cleaning supply closets was harassed because of her sex); Morris
v. Nat’l Can Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1489, 1491 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (recognizing that a female plaintiff who was
told she “might as well sit underneath his desk since that’s where everybody says [she does] her best
work” was harassed because of her sex); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th
Cir. 2001) (finding actionable sexual harassment under Title VII where a male waiter was
systematically abused for failing to act “as a man should act” and for walking and carrying his tray
“like a woman”); Zorn, 903 F. Supp. at 1237, 1244 (recognizing that repeated comments urging
plaintiff to act more feminine amounted to harassment because of her sex); Danna v. N.Y. Tel. Co.,
752 F. Supp. 594, 598, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (upholding female service technician’s sexual harassment
claim based on repeated suggestions that she act more feminine and cutesy); Sanchez v. City of
Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974, 978, 982 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (upholding a jury verdict in favor of female
police officer involved in bodybuilding who was harassed by male co-workers for failing to conform
to notions of appropriate femininity); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (finding actionable sexual harassment under Title VII where a male hotel butler was the
victim of assaults “of a sexual nature” by his male co-workers because they perceived him as
effeminate); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566–67 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that same-sex sexual
harassment was actionable under Title VII, regardless of the sexual orientation of the harasser, where two
brothers were verbally and physically harassed by heterosexual male co-workers because they were
perceived as effeminate), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
78. See, e.g., Hellebusch v. City of Wentzville, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20828 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 21,
1996) (recognizing the sex-based nature and gender-specific connotations of epithets such as
“fucking bitch,” “fucking whore,” “slut,” and “fucking cunt”); Perry-Baker v. Runyon, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15548 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 1996) (finding the same, vis-à-vis epithets such as “walking
pussy,” “cunt,” “bitch,” “whore,” and “slut”); Needy v. Village of Woodridge, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11813 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1997) (determining the same, vis-à-vis epithets such as “cunt,” “broad,” and
“bitch”).
79. See, e.g., Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve Co., 40 F.3d 230, 233, 237 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
that defendant’s conduct, which included slapping plaintiff’s buttocks, forcefully placing his foot in
her crotch and wiggling it, and pulling on the waist of her pants to reveal her undergarments, was
“because of sex”); Saum v. Widnall, 912 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Colo. 1996) (recognizing that defendant’s
conduct, which included casting the plaintiff as the “victim” in a simulated rape and exploitation
scenario, was “because of sex”); Pease v. Alford Photo Indus., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1188, 1201–02 (W.D.
Tenn. 1987) (recognizing that defendant’s conduct, which included a supervisor regularly touching
and fondling his female employees on the shoulders, arms, necks, breasts and thighs, was “because
of sex”).
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spectrum of sexes and gender roles that and a person’s sexual identity is not
80
always based on his or her biological organs.
Under the umbrella of Title VII’s “because of sex” language, many federal
and state courts have recognized the complexity of the term “sex” and found it
illegal to discriminate against employees not just based on their biological sex,
81
but also based on their gender identity or gender expression. The phrase
“gender identity” refers to one’s self-identification as a man or a woman,
82
regardless of one’s anatomical sex at birth. Usually, one’s gender identity
matches one’s anatomical sex; that is, people born with the physical
characteristics of males usually identify as men and those with the physical
characteristics of females usually identify as women. However, for some people,
gender identity does not always align with anatomical sex. Thus, for transsexual
people, gender identity and anatomical sex are not in agreement. Someone born
male may have a strong self-image and self-identification as a woman; someone
born female may have a strong internal self-image and self-identification as a
83
man.
The phrase “gender expression” refers to how society views and interprets
one’s gender identity based on the person’s manifestations through clothing,
behavior, and grooming. Someone’s gender identity may be the same as his or
her biological sex, but that person may still be perceived differently by others.
For example, someone may be born male and self-identify as a man, but may be
84
nonetheless perceived by others as feminine.
The Supreme Court has recognized that discrimination in the workplace
based on gender stereotypes meets the “because of sex” requirement of Title VII.
85
In the landmark case Price Waterhouse, the Court recognized a cause of action
for sex discrimination where the plaintiff was adversely affected by conduct that
penalized her for failing to conform to stereotypically female norms. In that case,
the plaintiff was denied partnership because her male partners perceived her as
too aggressive and “macho.” She was told to “walk more femininely, talk more
80. It is now commonly accepted that there is no intrinsic or stable sexual or gender identity. See
generally Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination: The Disaggregation of Sex From
Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLES 25 (1990) (“There is no
gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the
very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results.”).
81. Over twenty states have so ruled. See Gender Public Advocacy Coalition, States with
Gender Expression, Identity Protections Surpass Those with Sexual Orientation for First Time (July
1, 2004), http://www.gpac.org/archive/news/notitle.html?cmd=view&archive=news&msgnum
=0555 (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). With the 2004 ruling by the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. City of Salem,
378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a transsexual had a Title VII discrimination case when
he was criticized for failing to conform to sex stereotypes), twenty-one states now have protections
in place that ban workplace discrimination based on an individual’s gender expression or identity.
See id.
82. WorkplaceFairness.org, Gender Identity Discrimination, http://www.workplacefairness.
org/index.php?page=genderid&view=print&theme=6 (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
83. Id.
84. Id.; see, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566–67 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 523
U.S. 1001 (1998) (involving heterosexual sixteen-year-old whose sexuality was questioned because he
wore an earring); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (involving a male whose sexuality
was questioned because he did not have a wife or girlfriend).
85. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up [sic], have her hair styled, and
86
wear jewelry.” The Court rejected the assertion that these assessments of the
plaintiff were not based on her sex and held that she had a cause of action under
Title VII.
The Price Waterhouse Court recognized that the term “sex,” for purposes of
Title VII, extends beyond the notion of biological sex to encompass gender roles
and stereotypes that are imposed upon individuals as a result of their biological
sex. The Court therefore proscribed adverse conduct that is based on a person’s
failure to conform to stereotypical notions of gender-appropriate appearance
87
and demeanor.
Many lower courts have also found that harassment directed at a person
based on his or her failure to conform to gender stereotypes constitutes
harassment based on sex. For example, courts have found the “because of sex”
requirement to be satisfied where a female police officer who was involved in
bodybuilding and used steroids was harassed for failing to adhere to gender88
based stereotypes of appropriate female appearance and conduct; and where a
female repair service technician was told that she would have gotten more
89
assistance if she were more “feminine and cutesy.” These courts recognized,
implicitly or explicitly, that the plaintiff’s sex consists of a constellation of factors
including not only her biological attributes but also her conformity to genderbased stereotypes and her projected or perceived sexuality.
In each of these cases, the harassment was not directed toward all women
based on their biological status as women, but rather it was aimed at particular
women who diverged from gender-based norms. Nonetheless, the courts readily
concluded that this conduct was based on the targets’ sex because the traits
elicited the harassers’ hostilities only when exhibited by women. Accordingly, it is

86. Id. at 235.
87. After the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse expanded the coverage of Title VII to include
sex stereotypes, many courts concluded that the expansion should apply to transgendered people.
See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that “sex stereotyping
based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective
of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim
where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.”);
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding a claim brought by a
transgendered man, noting that the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse interpreted “sex” as
encompassing both anatomical sex and gender); Sturchio v. Ridge, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27345, *4–5
(D. Wash. Dec. 20, 2004) (holding that an employee who was subjected to harassment after her
sexual reassignment surgery asserted a cognizable claim under Title VII); Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus.,
164 Misc. 2d 547, 556 (N.Y. Misc. 1995) (holding in an action by an employee against his employer
for public humiliation after the employee’s reassignment surgery that: “[A]n employer who harasses
an employee because the person, as a result of surgery and hormone treatments, is now of a different
sex has violated our City prohibition against discrimination based on sex.”). However, while the law
is relatively undecided, many courts continue to adhere to a more rigid notion of “sex” in this
context, refusing to support claims by transgendered and transsexual plaintiffs. See, e.g., Spearman v.
Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Ulane v. Eastern Airlines 742 F.2d 1081,
1085 (1984) (holding that “Congress intended the term ‘sex’ to mean ‘biological male or female’ and
not one’s sexuality or sexual orientation”)). See generally Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17417, *27 n.59 (D. La. Sept. 16, 2002).
88. Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
89. Danna v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 752 F. Supp. 594, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also, e.g., supra note 77.
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apparent that cases analyzing sexual harassment have not adhered to a rigid,
simplistic conception of “sex” in assessing whether the conduct could be
characterized as conduct that occurred “because of” the plaintiff’s “sex” within the
meaning of Title VII. The courts have recognized that harassment based on
stereotypes of gender plays an integral role in perpetuating patterns of male
domination and female subordination that characterize workplace gender
hierarchies. Consequently, they have developed an understanding of sex-based
discrimination that recognizes the interrelationships between gender stereotypes,
sexual interactions, and sex discrimination in the employment market.
B. Judicial Reinvention of “Because of Sex” for the Equal Opportunity Harasser
As a result of Congress’ failure to clearly define “because of sex” in Title
VII and the wide array of judicial formulations of the causation standard, courts
resistant to the equal opportunity harasser defense have been able to find ways
around the “because of sex” hurdle. Meanwhile, scholars have proposed
additional approaches to this problem.
Some commentators have advocated abandoning the causation
90
requirement entirely, and some courts have gotten around the problem by
simply directing attention away from the “because of sex” language. In
McDonnell v. Cisneros, for example, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the
“perverse” result that would ensue “if a male worker could buy his supervisor
and his company immunity from Title VII liability by taking care to harass
91
sexually an occasional male worker, though his preferred targets were female.”
Rather than dissect the meaning of “because of sex” with a detailed critique of
previous cases subscribing to the equal opportunity harasser defense, the
McDonnell court simply relied on logic and reason, proclaiming that courts that
subscribe to the equal opportunity harasser defense “interpret sex
92
discrimination in too literal a fashion.” Similarly, the court in Doe v. Belleville,
commenting on a hypothetical bisexual harasser in dictum, suggested that
courts espousing the equal opportunity harasser defense have wrongly taken
the emphasis off the “factors we have regularly relied on [including] the content
(physical and verbal) of the harassment, its gravity, its effect on the plaintiff, and
93
its effect on the reasonable person.” In doing so, the court deflected attention
away from the causation requirement altogether and onto considerations it
found to be more critical to the outcome. These courts presumably took their

90. See, e.g., Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives
Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 65–67 (1991) (noting that Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence suggested that the Price Waterhouse majority dispensed entirely with any
causation requirement); Kearney, supra note 63, at 216.
91. McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating
Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (D. Wyo. 1993) (noting that “[a]n odd and inefficient result would
obtain” if the husband and wife’s lawsuit involving a dual complaint of harassment, were dismissed,
since each could then pursue individual actions).
92. McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 260.
93. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 590 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 523 U.S. 1001
(1998).
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lead from Supreme Court cases that use “because of sex” in the analysis but do
94
not elucidate the causal requirement implicit in Title VII.
Professor Schwartz advances another approach. He advocates a revival of
the “sex per se” rule under which sexual conduct in the workplace is always
“because of sex,” without regard to the discriminatory intent of the harasser.
Such a rule, he argues, would “eliminate the ‘bisexual harasser’ problem for
claims involving sexual conduct since all sexual conduct is ‘because of sex’
regardless of whether it is directed at just women, or equally at women and
95
men.”
Others have suggested adopting an individualized analysis. This approach
would examine each plaintiff’s claim separately without regard to other claims
against the same defendant and without requiring comparative evidence
showing that the other sex was treated differently. As noted in Brown v.
Henderson, “[i]n determining whether an employee has been discriminated
against ‘because of such individual’s . . . sex,’ the courts have consistently
emphasized that the ultimate issue is the reason for the individual plaintiff’s
96
treatment, not the relative treatment of different groups within the workplace.”
Looking at the claims individually would allow courts to consider whether
the harassment of one sex was quantitatively or qualitatively different from the
97
harassment of the other sex. That is, a supervisor may harass both men and
women employees, but to different degrees; or, a supervisor may harass both
men and women, but in different ways. Where that occurs, the conduct directed
at each plaintiff—if sufficiently severe and pervasive—would amount to sexual
harassment. But looking at the claims individually would also allow courts to
recognize claims by some women and some men in the same workplace, even
without such comparative evidence.
This approach was adopted in Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., which
involved male and female plaintiffs each alleging sexual harassment by the
same male supervisor. In that case, a male supervisor harassed female
employees by subjecting them to sexually abusive remarks and making sexual
advances toward them. He also harassed male employees by bragging about his
sexual prowess and graphically describing sexual acts he wanted to perform on
98
female employees and on the wives of some male employees. The court
99
“compartmentalized the claims into gender groups,” looking at the plaintiffs’
claims separately and focusing on the conduct targeted at each individual
100
without considering conduct directed at other individuals. The court noted, “it
is not unthinkable to argue that each individual who is harassed is being treated

94. See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751–52 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
95. Schwartz, supra note 63, at 1793.
96. Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.2d 246, 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “there is no per se bar
to maintaining a claim of sex discrimination where a person of another sex has been similarly
treated”).
97. See Calleros, supra note 57, at 73.
98. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1335 (D. Wyo. 1993).
99. Macready, supra note 57, at 673.
100. See Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337. See generally McCullough, supra note 18, at 482–85.
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badly because of gender,” and suggested that the remarks made to both male
102
and female plaintiffs were “gender-driven.”
While the treatment may have been relatively equal in severity toward
male and female plaintiffs in Chiapuzio, the reason each plaintiff was targeted
was quite clearly “because of sex.” As for the conduct complained of by the
female plaintiffs, it could certainly be viewed as sex-based since the supervisor
was a heterosexual male who did not make similar remarks and advances to any
male employees. Male employees, however, were harassed in another way.
Although the defendant’s remarks were primarily aimed at the female plaintiffs,
the court found they were also intended to demean their husbands, as the
remarks were often made in earshot of the husbands and typically involved
reference to the fact that he could “do a better job of making love to [the wives]
103
than the [husbands] could.”
Finally, many commentators addressing the issue of the equal opportunity
harasser have advocated a broad interpretation of “sex,” consistent with Price
Waterhouse and its progeny, to include not just biological sex, but also gender,
sexual conduct, core sexual or gender identity, gender role identity, and sexual
104
or gender expression. Construing the notion of “sex” under Title VII in this
more complex, multifaceted way would open the door to a finding of actionable
sex-based harassment of a female employee based on a failure to conform to
stereotypical notions of femininity and of a male employee in the same
workplace based on a failure to conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity.
IV. RETHINKING CAUSATION IN DRESS CODE LITIGATION: APPLYING EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY HARASSER DOCTRINE TO JESPERSEN AND ITS PROGENY
105

Each of the approaches to “because of sex” discussed above could be
easily imported to the appearance discrimination cases. Courts could simply
choose to shift their attention away from comparing the burdens imposed by
sex-specific dress codes on each sex and redirect it to more important factors
such as the harm imposed on plaintiffs from the dress requirements. Application
of the unequal burdens test, which would uphold a sex-specific dress code
based on gender-based stereotypes burdensome to both men and women, is no
less “perverse” than the application of the equal opportunity harasser defense.
But this approach would be subject to the same criticism it receives in the equal
opportunity harasser context for ignoring Title VII’s clear causation mandate.
Dress code jurisprudence could also adapt the “sex per se” rule, as
advocated by Professor Schwartz, under which sexualized conduct directed at
both men and women would automatically be considered sexual harassment,

101. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337 (quoting John J. Donahue, Review Essay: Advocacy Versus
Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1610–11 (1992)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1335.
104. See, e.g., Calleros, supra note 57, at 56; Franke, supra note 57, at 772; Kearny, supra note 63, at
212; Kirshenbaum, supra note 63, at 156; Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience: Reflections
on the Development of Sexual Harassment Law, GEO. L. J. 813, 829 (2002); McCullough, supra note 18, at
471.
105. See discussion supra Part III.B.

18__ZALESNE.DOC

2/8/2007 2:10 PM

LESSONS FROM EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HARASSER DOCTRINE

553

despite the fact that it is directed evenly at men and women. Under parallel
reasoning, sex-specific dress code policies that require employees to wear
sexualized or provocative uniforms would be inherently based on sex, and
accordingly would be a per se violation of Title VII. But while the sex per se rule
106
would neatly address sexually exploitive dress requirements, where for the
most part courts have already recognized the harm, it would fail to address
other concrete harms experienced by women and men from dress requirements
that are not provocative or sexy, but that force conformity to destructive gender
norms.
This Part focuses on two other means by which courts have dealt with the
causation problem when men and women are both subjected to harassing
conduct. This section advocates an individualized analysis that would look at
the effect of dress codes on individual women and individual men who fail to
comport with gender-based stereotypes about how men and women should
look and act. Sex-specific dress codes perpetuate gendered paradigms that
empower some men and subordinate women and feminized men, and are
therefore imposed “because of sex” in violation of Title VII. This Part also
advocates a broadened definition of “sex” whereby dress codes would give rise
to a Title VII claim if they discriminate against men or women based on gender
identity or expression.
A. Individualized Analysis: Harm to Both Men and Women from Forced
Adherence to a Gender Paradigm that Legitimizes Social Norms that
Devalue Women
Sex-specific dress codes may impose relatively equal burdens on men and
women but may restrict the autonomy of both men and women based on gender
distinctions, giving rise to claims by those females and males who do not
conform to the gender-based restriction. Because of the intangible harms to both
men and women from forced adherence to destructive gender stereotypes, each
claim would be “because of sex.”
The unequal burdens test implies that a dress code as a whole can treat
men and women equally, while applying “different, but somehow
equivalent . . . restrictions to their freedom to choose their clothing, makeup,
107
jewelry and hairstyles.” But dress requirements for women under a sexspecific policy cannot be lumped together and then compared in general to the
108
dress requirements for men. “For the man who wants to wear a pony-tail or a
skirt, it is no consolation that women are prohibited from wearing short hair or

106. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally Karl E.
Klare, Power Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395, 1417 (1992)
(stating “it is now illegal to require a woman to wear a sexually revealing outfit that has or likely
will result in unwelcome verbal or physical harassment”).
107. Robert Wintemute, Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination: Transsexualism, Sexual
Orientation and Dress Codes, 60 MOD. L. REV. 334, 355 (1997).
108. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the makeup requirement should be viewed in isolation from the hair and
hands policies).
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trousers.” A grooming code requiring men to wear their hair short and women
to wear skirts, in effect, discriminates against the female employee who
genuinely wishes to wear pants and the male employee who wants to wear long
hair. A woman under that policy is denied an opportunity she would have if she
were a man, based only upon stereotypes of acceptable male and female
behavior, and a man is denied an opportunity he would have if he were a
woman, again based only on stereotypical norms, thus amounting to
110
discrimination against some men and some women.
1. Harm to Women
Most courts that have had the opportunity to apply the unequal burdens
test have been unwilling to consider the harmful effects of sex stereotyping
inherent in sex-specific dress codes as one of the burdens faced by plaintiffs.
Though for the most part, courts have recognized the harm to women of
111
imposing sexually exploitive dress requirements, where dress requirements
are not provocative or sexy, courts have uniformly ignored the concrete harms
experienced by women who are forced to conform to externally imposed gender
112
norms that “construct, exploit, and devalue feminine attributes.”
In Jespersen, for example, the majority considered only the tangible harms of
a dress policy that required men to maintain short haircuts and neatly trimmed
fingernails and women to wear makeup and nail polish and keep their hair
styled. Since the cost of makeup and nail polish were considered nominal, and
the time required to comply with each policy was roughly equivalent, the court
113
found the burden on females to be no greater than the burden on males. The
court failed, however, to consider the fact that the makeup, hair, and dress
requirements are deeply rooted in traditional notions of how men and women
should look and are based on stereotypes that deride feminine traits and
marginalize individuals who possess such traits.
Courts typically permit gender-specific dress codes that are consistent with
114
community norms. In this way, “courts may excuse dress and appearance
requirements they deem trivial in their impact on employees, or neutral in
affecting men and women alike, or essential to the employer’s lawful business

109. Wintemute, supra note 107, at 355.
110. Id.; see also Klare, supra note 106, at 1420 (noting “the law empowers employers to insist that
employees conform to socially constructed norms and expectations about how the sexes should act
and look. Employers may punish people who challenge or deviate from prevailing norms”).
111. See Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). See generally Klare, supra note 106, at
1417 (stating “it is now illegal to require a woman to wear a sexually revealing outfit that has or
likely will result in unwelcome verbal or physical harassment”).
112. Thomas Ling, Smith v. City of Salem: Title VII Protects Contra-Gender Behavior, 40 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 277, 282 (2005). Several commentators have emphasized the fact that the Jespersen court
failed to acknowledge the intangible effects of the makeup policy, leaving women feeling like
“ornamental objects of beauty to be contemplated, [and] not agents with talents to be esteemed.”
Cruz, supra note 36, at 248; see also Hillary Bouchard, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.: Employer
Appearance Standards and the Promotion of Gender Stereotypes, 58 ME. L. REV. 203, 218 (2006).
113. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110.
114. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2557; Bouchard, supra note 112, at 220–21.
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115

Community norms, however, are often based on harmful
objectives.”
stereotypes that privilege existing power structures favoring men.
Sex-specific dress and appearance codes generally perpetuate gendered
paradigms that subordinate women. The demands on women from sex-specific
dress requirements are notoriously “much more complex than men’s, involving
more frequent changes in fashion, more time and effort to assemble, and a
greater premium placed on having different clothes for different occasions and
116
on not being seen in the same outfits too frequently.” Substantively, women’s
standards tend to “objectify women and construct them as inferior, submissive,
117
and less competent than men.” Furthermore, the clothing women are expected
to wear has, throughout European history, “conveyed the message that its
wearers are fragile, helpless, debilitated, armored, hobbled, decorative, non118
threatening, useless, and immobile.”
The classic example of a seemingly innocuous but actually harmful dress
code is one that requires men to wear suits and ties and women to wear skirts.
Though the tangible burdens of such a policy—including the costs and time
required to purchase and wear such clothing—may be roughly equivalent for
both sexes, the intangible burdens on women far outweigh those on men. While
a requirement that male employees wear a business suit generally has the
legitimate purpose to “convey confidence and command respect,” the
underlying basis for the concomitant requirement that female employees wear a
skirt are stereotypes that imply “women should be relegated to a more passive
119
role in business or, worse, that women should have a certain sexual appeal.”
The requirement of a skirt, which makes women seem “less professional and
120
more ornamental or vulnerable than those who wear pants,” emerged from
121
women’s “historically inferior status,” while pants, which generally symbolize

115. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2544.
116. Id. at 2547.
117. Id.; see also Klare, supra note 106, at 1419. Klare observes, “employer bans on women wearing
pants to work are based almost entirely on sex stereotypes: that women are less capable than men,
that they are better suited for less active or assertive roles, that women must do more than men to
appear serious and business-like, that a woman in pants at work is sexually provocative and
therefore disruptive, that women’s clothing (skirts) should enhance their allure as sex objects, and so
on.” Id.
118. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2547. Women walk a fine line when it comes to dress in the
workplace, and are often “caught in what the Supreme Court has described as the ‘catch-22’ of sex
discrimination based on gender stereotypes: they are harassed both for possessing stereotypically
feminine traits that are devalued in the male-dominated workplace and for failing to conform to
gender-defined norms dictating that women should not exhibit the qualities of strength and
aggressiveness that are rewarded in the employment market.” Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne,
Simulated Sodomy and Other Forms of Heterosexual “Horseplay”: Same Sex Sexual Harassment, Workplace
Gender Hierarchies and the Myth of the Gender Monolith Before and After Oncale, 11 YALE J. L. & FEM. 155,
164 (1999). If a woman dresses too “soft, frilly, and ornamental” she may not appear competent, and
if she dresses too formal or business-like, she risks being perceived as inappropriately departing
from accepted gender identifications. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2547, 2552.
119. Miller, supra note 22, at 1367. Even “the male dress prohibition, trivial as it may seem to
most individuals, reflects and perpetuates gender-role expectations that men wear pants and only
women, or sissies, wear skirts.” Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2571.
120. Id. at 2569.
121. Id. at 2570.
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power and competence, “perpetuate man’s historically commanding status.”
Likewise, as noted by the Jespersen dissent, a policy that women wear makeup
contains an implicit message that “women’s undoctored faces compare
unfavorably to men’s . . . because of a cultural assumption—and gender-based
stereotype—that women’s faces are incomplete, unattractive, or unprofessional
123
without full makeup.” By enforcing such company policies, courts reinforce,
rather than challenge, stereotypically gendered assumptions regarding proper
124
dress and appearance and a woman’s role in the workplace.
2. Harm to Men
A policy requiring men to conform to a certain image of masculinity can be
equally restrictive. A dress code requiring men to wear suits and ties and women
to wear skirts perpetuates a set of gender norms that feminize women and
125
masculinize men, thereby punishing men for displaying devalued characteristics
of femaleness and femininity. This hegemonic view of masculinity derives from
standards of male “homosocial” interactions, which refers to the “nonsexual
126
attractions held by men . . . for members of their own sex.” These standards
include emotional detachment, competition, and the sexual objectification of
127
women. First, emotional detachment serves to “maintain both clear individual
identity boundaries and the norms of hegemonic masculinity.” This is so because
for a man to share his feelings is to reveal weaknesses; withholding such feelings
128
is to maintain control. Second, competition allows a man to support an identity
based on separation and distinction and not on likeness and cooperation,
129
facilitating hierarchy in relationships as opposed to symmetry. Finally, a man’s
engagement in the sexual objectification of women facilitates this separative
identity by distancing the self from all that is associated with being female,
130
thereby maintaining male superiority. This objectification enhances the distance
131
between the sexes, enabling men to depersonalize the oppression of women.
These standards work together to form the contours of what may be considered
132
the masculine image. In general, discrimination against men based on this
hegemonic norm is underpinned by the same stereotypes used in discrimination
against women, gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and other groups because they do not
look or act like they are supposed to according to their biological indicators. Thus,
whether directed at women or at men, gender regulation perpetuates patterns of

122. Id. at 2571.
123. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting).
124. Bouchard, supra note 112, at 221; Klare, supra note 106, at 1419.
125. Franke, supra note 57, at 696.
126. Sharon R. Bird, Welcome to the Men’s Club: Homosociality and the Maintenance of Hegemonic
Masculinity, 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 120, 121 (1996).
127. Id. at 122.
128. Id.
129. Id
130. Id. at 123.
131. Id.
132. While individual conceptions of masculinity may depart from this hegemonic norm,
nonhegemonic meanings are “oppressed due to perceptions of ‘appropriate’ masculinity.” Id. at 127.
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male domination and gender-based exclusion in the workplace. It ensures that
women conform to stereotypical images of “who and what type[s] of workers
133
‘women’ are supposed to be,” and that men “project the desired manliness”
134
necessary to preserve the “masculinized image” of certain types of work.
Accordingly, both men and women can be harmed from such mandates, but for
different historical reasons and with different social impact.
B. Adopting an Expanded Definition of Sex: Discrimination Based on Gender
Atypicality
Even an appearance policy that is applied equally to men and women may
burden members of both sexes who fail to conform to traditional gender norms.
135
Appearances are deeply connected to identity; mandatory dress codes inhibit
individual employees’ autonomy, restraining their ability to express their true
identities. When employers force outward compliance with gender stereotypes,
sexual identity is elided with sexual expression and behavior and any deviance
from expected gender roles is punished.
As discussed above, courts have interpreted “because of sex” in its
broadest sense to mean not only biological sex, but also anything relating to
gender, sexual or gender expression, behavior, anatomy, or identity. It is
apparent from the sexual harassment and sex discrimination cases that Title VII
encompasses not only conduct directed, for example, at women based on their
biological status as women, but also conduct directed at women based on their
failure to conform to stereotypical assumptions as to how women should look
and act. In Price Waterhouse and the other lower court cases discussed above, the
hostility experienced by the plaintiffs was not targeted at all males, or all
females, as biologically-defined classes. Instead, harassment was directed
towards men and women who exhibited certain traits, which were in tension
with socially defined norms and expectations for appearance and demeanor
based on their biological sex.
Notwithstanding Price Waterhouse and its progeny, courts continue to
permit dress codes that are based on gender stereotypes. In Jespersen, the court
explicitly refused to apply Price Waterhouse, noting that case applies to
“discrimination against an employee on the basis of that employee’s failure to
dress and behave according to the stereotype corresponding with her gender,”
but not specifically to “sex-differentiated appearance and grooming standards
136
on its male and female employees.” The court emphasized that a sexual
harassment claim for gender stereotyping is distinct from a claim of gender
133. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1754 (April 1998).
134. Id. at 1775 (“[M]en have a lot at stake in assuring a tight linkage between their work and their
masculinity. It is crucial for many men to maintain control over the masculinized image of their work. If a
job is to confer masculinity, it must be held by those who project the desired manliness.”); see also id. at
n.472 (discussing ways in which men create and perpetuate idealized masculine images of their work).
135. Some have argued that “our behavior, dress and other ‘performances’ are at least to some
degree constitutive of our identity.” See Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why
Identity Performance Demands are Neither Harmless nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 300 (2005–2006)
(critiquing articles by Kenji Yoshino, Devon Carbado, and Mitu Gulati).
136. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 409 F.3d
1061 (9th Cir. 2005).
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stereotyping in the context of appearance and grooming cases. In so doing, it
failed to consider the fact that the makeup requirement made Jespersen feel
“sick, degraded, exposed, and . . . forced her to be feminine,” and, in so doing,
failed to account for the “harms associated with forced gender conformity for
138
persons whose gender identity and expression are not shared by the judges.”
The Jespersen court, in effect, required a showing that all women were burdened,
not just women like Jespersen who found the policy inconsistent with her
gender identity.
Scholars have overwhelmingly agreed that the Jespersen court’s
interpretation of Price Waterhouse is strained and unjustified and that dress codes
derived from socially constructed gender norms should be found to violate Title
139
VII. The differences between the two plaintiffs are minimal: “Both cases
involve a female employee, terminated or held back from advancement based
on her failure to comply with stereotypes associated with her sex. Plaintiff
Hopkins in Price Waterhouse failed to dress and act femininely enough, while
140
Plaintiff Jespersen failed to wear makeup as a ‘proper woman’ should.” There
seems to be no justification for finding that harassing someone because of her

137. Id.; see also Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874, 875 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)
(applying Price Waterhouse where male restaurant host was regularly mocked and tormented for
failing to conform to male stereotypes, but refusing to specify whether Price Waterhouse applies to
gender-based distinctions such as dress and grooming requirements). But see Carroll v. Talman Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1032–33 (7th Cir. 1979) (applying the unequal burdens test,
but also recognizing that appearance codes justified by “offensive stereotypes [are] prohibited by
Title VII”).
138. Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don’t Make the Man (or Woman), But Gender Identity Might, 15
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90, 113 (2006).
139. Research revealed no law review article espousing the unequal burdens test as applied. See,
e.g., Bartlett, supra note 8 (arguing that reliance on community norms in application of the unequal
burdens test perpetuates harmful stereotypes); Bouchard, supra note 112, at 205 (arguing that the
“outdated unequal burdens test” fails to adequately consider the gender stereotypes implicated by
employer appearance policies); Cruz, supra note 36 (arguing that the unequal burdens test reinforces
social division and stereotypical differences between men and women); Kelly, supra note 36 (arguing
that the unequal burden test fails to account for intangible burdens imposed on women by employer
appearance standards); Klare, supra note 106 (advocating “appearance autonomy” and arguing that
dress codes that distinguish between men and women on the basis of commonly accepted
community standards of appearance are sexist and patriarchal and allow employers to impose
onerous and discriminatory attractiveness standards upon women so long as there is not a greater
burden on them than their male co-workers); Miller, supra note 22, at 1358 (arguing that the unequal
burdens test, which requires weighing and comparing the burdens imposed on each sex, is
ineffective because courts fail to consider sexual stereotyping in grooming standards, the most
common form of harmful discrimination); Raskin, supra note 8, at 267 (arguing that Price Waterhouse
should be applied to sex-specific employer dress codes that are otherwise “neutral,” as sex-based
appearance policies reinforce the oppressive social system); Recent Case: Title VII—Sex
Discrimination—Ninth Circuit Holds that Women Can be Required to Wear Makeup as a Condition of
Employment—Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), 118 HARV. L. REV.
2429, 2435–36 (2005) (taking issue with the reasoning of Jespersen and arguing that appearance
standards based on conformity to sexual stereotypes should be impermissible based on Price
Waterhouse).
140. Bouchard, supra note 112, at 219.
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failure to conform to sex stereotypes is unacceptable while firing her for the
141
same reason is acceptable.
Title VII sexual harassment cases recognize that most important differences
between men and women are grounded in gender-normativity and the
behavioral aspects of sexual identity, not in biology. It is gender and the
hierarchy of gender differences which transform an anatomical difference into a
socially relevant distinction. Accordingly, under the broader definition of sex,
employer-mandated appearance codes, like the one in Jespersen requiring
women to dress like women and men to dress like men, strike at the heart of a
person’s gender identity and, therefore, inherently discriminate on the basis of
sex.
V. CONCLUSION
For many, the harm from sex-specific dress codes is de minimis: shave your
beard, cut your hair, wear the uniform. But for some, forced gender conformity
is problematic beyond the tangible, striking at the heart of a person’s identity.
Though courts have long recognized the harm from gender identity
discrimination in other contexts, forced conformity to normative stereotypes
about gender expression is considered acceptable in the context of appearance
codes. Such codes are typically justified on the basis of pervasive community
expectations—expectations that reinforce and freeze gender stereotypes that
view males as the dominant and competent sex, while relegating females to their
traditional domestic, sexual, and reproductive roles.
The unequal burdens test requires courts to compare the burden imposed
by sex-specific grooming and dress regulations on men and women, and strikes
down a policy only where the burden on one sex is greater than the burden
imposed on the other. But sex-specific appearance codes, by their very nature,
invoke and perpetuate gender-based stereotypes that are harmful to women and
penalize those who diverge from prescribed gender roles. By mandating
adherence to a gender paradigm, dress codes can suppress sexual autonomy
which in turn produces oppressive sex and gender identities. When courts
sanction gender-mandated attire they take a narrow view of sexual identity;
they bifurcate personhood into “male” and “female” components and
universally attribute distinct characteristics to men and women without
variation. The paradigm of genital identity establishes and maintains the
142
hierarchical differentiation between men and women. Thus, when courts
accept the validity of dress policies based on biological sexual differences, they
perpetuate stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and ignore normative
143
gender ideology, resulting in devaluation of people who are feminized.

141. See Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1084 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Kelly, supra note 36, at 61
(noting the irony in having a case’s outcome “turn on whether the company actually instituted a
grooming policy based on gender stereotypes or used considerations of gender stereotyping in
making employment decisions”).
142. Allan C. Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 875–
76 (1985).
143. Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual
Orientation to its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 170 (1996).
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The unequal burdens test had an admirable goal of preventing the sexual
exploitation of women in the workplace by prohibiting the imposition of rules
requiring women to dress in provocative or sexy uniforms to attract customers.
Indeed, in many cases, this test has led to fair and logical results. For example,
144
the test made sense in Frank v. United Airlines, where United Airlines imposed
more stringent weight restrictions on female flight attendants than on male
flight attendants, given that the policy directly imposed disparate standards for
men and women. However, where standards are not capable of direct
comparison—such as where women are required to wear makeup and men are
required to keep their hair short—the test breaks down. In such cases, courts
permit the regulations, as long as the burden on men and women is equal. This
stands in stark contrast with the burgeoning case law prohibiting workplace
discrimination on the basis of gender identity and expression.
Sexual harassment law has been through the machinations of the “because
of sex” causation requirement in the parallel context of the equal opportunity
harasser. After more than a quarter of a century of jurisprudence in that area,
courts are headed in the right direction by recognizing the sex-based nature of
harassing conduct that affects both men and women but in different ways. Can
dress code jurisprudence be far behind?

144.

216 F.3d 845, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

